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The sponsors of current proposals have mostly tailed 
or refused to say what revenues they would hold constant 
and have not presented evidence backing up their claims. 
Bradley and Gephardt refuse to release data. Ouayle's 
data show that hi$ 1984 plan l> neutral lor payroll and 
individual Income taxes, but he (ails to specify the nature 
of his corporate la* proposals, some of which bear on 
Individual receipts also. Kemp and Kasten hint that their 
bill Is actually a revenue loser but still call It revenue- 
neulrat. The evidence on DeConclnl suggests his bill 
could be either neutral or   large revenue gainer.
SPECIAL REPORT
More generally, bills that keep revenues constant for 
lower-Income groups may do so by penalizing those who 
ere poor and benefiting the well-to-do who appear to 
have low Income lor tax purposes. Even calculating that a 
bill is revenue-neutral requires making patently absurd 
assumptions about taxpayer behavior. Finally, choosing 
a revenue-neutral bill over one thai loses revenue msv 
lead to perverse results for the deficit and the economy, 
even on a static basis.
Perhaps that applause lor revenue neutrality should be 
still fainter.
Chairman PICKLE. Mr. Woodbury, with the U pjohn Institute.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN A. WOODBURY, 3EN1OK RESEARCH 
ECONOMIST, W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE FOR EMPLOYMENT RE- 
SEARCH
Mr. WOODBURY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be 
here. I should mention immediately that I speak for myself and not 
necessarily for the Upjohn Institute or Michigan State University 
with which I am also affiliated.
What I would like to do is simply summarize my written testimo 
ny and emphasize a few points. My comments will focus on three 
issues. First, the growth of fringe benefits and reasons for that 
growth. Second, fringe benefit coverage and the implications of 
that pattern of coverage for income distribution. And third, equity 
of the tax system and revenue losses that result from fringe benefit 
exemption.
Everyone here is well aware of the dramatic growth of non-wage 
benefits during the post-World War II years. The fact of fringe ben 
efit growth is simply not controversial. There is more controversy I 
believe over the causes of that growth. Several studies listed in my 
testimony have found convincing evidence that the favorable tax 
treatment of fringe benefits, that is their exemption from Federal 
income and payroll taxes has had a highly significant impact on 
employer provision of benefits.
Many readers of these studies and even one or two of the re 
searchers themselves seem to have inferred from these studies that 
favorable tax treatment is the major or even the only cause of 
fringe benefit growth in recent years. I believe this is a serious 
error and for two reasons. First, the same studies also find that a 
variety of other factors have influenced fringe benefit growth; the 
growth of real incomes and the aging of the labor force deserve 
particular mention because they have increased right along with 
the marginal income tax rate. Further, they seem to have a posi 
tive effect on benefits of the same order of magnitude as do in 
creases in the tax rate.
Second, I am less confident than some researchers that we have 
successfully separated the effects of rising real incomes from the ef 
fects of rising tax rates. This is a statistical issue I comment on 
more fully in my written testimony.
Why does all this matter? It matters I think because one of the 
most frequently used arguments against taxing fringe benefits is 
that by so doinj* employer-provided fringe benefits, health and re 
tirement plans in particular, would be reduced or even would dis-
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appear. Statistical findings indicate this is simply not true. We 
would blunt one incentive and one incentive only for further 
growth of employer-provided benefits if we were to tax them.
The other forces behind fringe benefit growth would continue, 
however. Insurance and pension plans would still be a better buy 
when purchased through the employer. The work force would con 
tinue to age. Employers would still use deferred benefits as a 
means of reducing turnover. Real incomes would continue to grow. 
So we would not kill the goose that laid the golden egg and witness 
the demise of the voluntary fringe benefit system if we tax fringe 
benefits.
About the distribution of fringe benefits I want to make Just one 
point. Taken as a whole voluntarily provided benefits do increase 
the inequality of the distribution of income. But there is one bene 
fit, health insurance, that seems to be roughly proportionally dis 
tributed. Health insurance it seems neither greatly increases nor 
decreases the equality of the distribution of income.
Finally, a few words on the equity of the tax system and revenue 
losses that result from fringe exemptions. It is quite clear that the 
exemption of fringe benefits from taxation induces, introduces both 
vertical and horizontal inequities into the tax system. That is, 
those with greater ability to pay do not necessarily pay proportion 
ally greater taxes. This follows from the fact that higher paid em 
ployees also receive a higher proportion of their total compensation 
as fringes on which they are not taxed. Also, two workers with the 
same total compensation may pay quite different tax bills if one re 
ceives only wage income wnereas the other receives some fringe 
benefits. Finally, we are all acutely aware of the revenue losses re 
sulting from the exemption of fringes.
The pure solution to these inequities and the revenue losses that 
result is the subjection of all employer contributions to Federal 
payroll and personal income taxes. Because of the opposition such 
proposals would likely meet, and have met, a variety of proposals 
to tax one benefit, health insurance, have been put forward.
Taxing health insurance contributions is an alluring prospect 
and represents a step in the right direction, but suffers from two 
important defects I feel. First, if we want to improve the equity of 
the tax system health contributions should be the last benefit to 
fully or partially tax, not the first. The reason again is that health 
contributions alone among voluntarily provided fringes are distrib 
uted roughly proportionally.
The second defect of capping health contributions alone or any 
single contribution alone is that such an approach opens the door 
to tax avoidance by substitution away from the newly taxed benefit 
and towards still untaxed benefits. Such substitution is more than 
merely an academic matter. It means the existing estimates of rev 
enue gains resulting from taxing health contributions may be too 
high. I should mention we have no microeconomic evidence at this 
point on the degree to which pensions and health insurance are 
substitutes. But developing such estimates should be a high priori 
ty for research.
In short, to mitigate inequities in the present system a uniform 
tax treatment of all benefits is required. Also, based on my own re 
search and that of others I am unconvinced that taxation of em-
4t>U
ployer contributions would result in disappearance or even reduc 
tion of fringe benefits.
I would therefore advocate a limit on the proportion of total com 
pensation that could be provided without Federal payroll or person 
al income taxation. This plan is similar to the second part of the 
Munnell proposal, and it has three advantages. First, it is compre 
hensive. Second, it focuses on the proportion of total compensation, 
and so would obviate the wrangling that has taken place over 
dollar sum caps on tax-free contributions to health insurance. Fi 
nally, it would have a minimal effect on workers and their benefits 
while it would forestall further erosion of the tax base.
Thank you.
Chairman PICKLE. Thank you.
[The prepared statement follows:]
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN A. WOODBURY, SENIOR RESEARCH ECONOMIST, W.E. UPJOHN 
INSTITUTE FOR EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH*
THE TAX TREATMENT OF FRINGE BENEFITS: WHAT DO WE KNOW AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE
LEARNED?
.The rather frivolous appelation that has been given to nonwage benefits  
"fringe" benefits tends to mask both the importance of these benefits to workers 
and the far-reaching implications of their favored tax status. For it is difficult to 
think of health care or retirement income plans as merel? decorative, peripheral, or 
frilly parts of the compensation package in an age when wealth services account for 
over five percent of national income and when over eleven percent of the population 
is aged 65 or more. And further, the employer-provision of these benefits affects a 
multitude of economic outcomes and behavior: the distribution of income and the 
equity of that distribution; the size of the income and payroll tax bases and the 
equity of the tax system; the use (or overuse) of the health-care system and the 
timing of retirement.
What follows is a necessarily selective review of the burgeoning economic re 
search on nonwage benefits specifically private pensions and health-insurance 
plans and an equally selective summary of the lacunae in that research. The focus 
is on a few questions that are of immediate importance to policy: How much have 
nonwage benefits grown and why? Who is covered and what are the implications of 
the existing pattern of coverage for income distribution? What changes in the tax 
treatment of nonwage benefits would yield significant revenue gains, and what are 
the implications of these changes for the equity of the tax system? What are some of 
the significant effects of employer-provision of benefits on workers' behavior and 
how do these induced behaviors affect in turn other economic outcomes?
HOW MUCH, AND WHY, HAVE FRINGE BENEFITS GROWN?
It is by now a commonplace observation that nonwage benefits voluntarily provid 
ed by employers have grown dramatically in the post-World War II period. The 
Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates that voluntary nonwage benefits (that is, 
"other labor income," which includes employer contributions to all voluntary funds 
such as pensions, profit-sharing, group health and life, workers' compensation, and 
supplemental unemployment) rose from 2.3 percent of private sector total compensa 
tion in 1948 to 10.3 percent in 1982.' For the sample of companies surveyed by the 
Chamber of Commerce, voluntary contributions to pensions, health insurance, and
* The views stated here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute.
1 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, The National Income and Produce Accounts of the 
United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), Tables fi.15 and 6.GB 
and Survey of Current Business 63 (July 1983), Tables 6.15 and fi.CB For these purposes, total 
compensation is defined as the sum of wages and salaries and i^bar labor income that is, ex 
cluding contributions to social insurance. (Social insurance contritions are included in the 
income and product accounts' measure of "compensation" in Table !;:5 of the accounts.)
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other "agreed upon" items rose from about five percent of total compensation in 
1951 to 11.6 percent in 1982. 2
In large part, these increases have been in the form of contributions to retirement 
and (particularly) health-insurance plans whereas about 60 percent of voluntary 
contributions were in the form of retirement and health benefits in 1948, nearly 84 
percent of voluntary contributions were for retirement and health benefits in 19*82. 3
Although no one disputes the enormous of nonwage compensation, there is less 
certainty about the causes of this growth. The litany of reasons for the provision of 
fringe benefits includes: preferential treatment under the federal personal and cor 
porate tax codes; economies of scale in the provision of pensions and insurance; ef 
forts to improve workers' productivity and reduce turnover by deferring payment of 
benefits; unionization; changing demographic composition of the labor force; and 
rising real incomes.4
To what degree can each of these factors explain the growth of fringe-benefit pro 
vision? Although there is substantial evidence that unions and collective bargaining 
exert a positive independent effect on the provision of nonwage benefits, the stagna 
tion of private-sector union growth since the 1950s makes unionism an unikely
- •• • .1 J- r • .... « «•__•!——1-. -L !_ .———1 —— _ It——1. it—— III.——U_«l«
j, i       ,-    ,
^enefit provision ..  _....  
ployers are taking advantage of the lower costs that result from group purchases of 
pensions and health benefits, and also that pension and insurance providers are re 
ducing overhead and administrative costs by expanding their asset or risk pools  
but these changes should probably be viewed as responses to an increasing demand 
for benefits rather than as autonomous forces causing that increase.9
Deferral of income has been shown quite convincingly to reduce labor turnover, 
and by reference, to improve productivity. 7 But again it is unclear that the desire to 
reduce turnover has been important to the growth of nonwage benefits. The only 
existing study of this question concludes that considerations of productivity and 
turnover are far less potent explanators of pension growth than is the tax treatment 
of pension contributions. 8
The most likely causes of fringe-benefits growth, then, are the aging of the labor 
force, favorable tax treatment of benefits, and rising real incomes (that is, increases 
in income apart from the implications such increases have for the tax rates faced by 
households). Several studies have confirmed the influence of all three of these fac-
influences on the provision of health, life, and pension benefits.
That several independent researchers using various data sources and somewhat 
varying techniques should all arrive at similar conclusions is fairly persuasive. But I 
would like to sound at least one warning about the interpretation of these results, 
lest they be misconstrued. It should not be inferred from these studies that rising 
marginal tax rates are the only, or even the most important, cause of fringe-benefit
8 Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Fringe Benefits 1951 (Washington, D.C.: Cham 
ber of Commerce, 1952), Table 3, p. 9; and Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Employee 
Benefits 1982 (Washington, D.C.: Chamber of Commerce, 1984), Table 4, p. 8. Figures in the text 
equal "pension, insurance, and other agreed upon payments" as a percentage of gross payroll 
plus pension, insurance and other agreed upon payments. Thus, legally required payments are 
excluded, and rest periods and other payments for time not worked are included as part of the 
wage. The Chamber of Commerce sample started out as a rather selective high-benefit sample, 
and has become more representative over the years. Note that, unlike the National Income ana 
Product Accounts, profit-sharing is not lumped with pension contributions in the Chamber of 
Commerce data.
s Table 6.15 in the National Income and Product Accounts and in Survey of Current Business.
* See Rice (1966), Lester (1967), and Long and Scott (1982) for general discussions. The issue of 
improving productivity and reducing turnover the so-called agency motive for providing de 
ferred benefits have been treated by 1/jgue (1979) and Lazear (1981).
8 See, among others, Freeman (1981), Alpert (1982), Rossiter and Taylor (1982), and Fosu 
(1984), and Mincer (1981). Freeman and Mincer differ sharply on the underlying causes of the 
union nonwage benefit effect.
6 Mitchell and Andrews (1981) offer an empirical treatment of scale economies of pension pro 
vision.
' Schiller and Weiss (1979) and Wolf and Levy (1984).
8 Mumy and Manson (1983).
  Alpert (1983), Atrostic (1983), Leibowitz 1983). Long nnd Srott (1983), Sloan and Adamnche 
(1983), Taylor and Wilensky (1983), Turner (1981), Vroman and Anderson (1984), and Woodbury 
(1983).
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growth. Correspondingly, it should not be inferred that if the favorable tax t
reat 
ment of fringes were abolished then fringe-benefit plans would disappear. I feel 
it is 
important to make these points because I am less confident than some that we 
have 
successfully separated the effects of rising incomes from the effects of rising ma
rgin 
al tax rates on fringe provision. Not only have incomes and tax rates grown tog
eth 
er over time, but also in cross-section there is a close relation between the inc
ome 
and the marginal tax rate faced by a household. This close relation poses prob
lems 
for econometric estimation. Although together, rising incomes and rising marg
inal 
tax rates on wages income have surely accounted for most of the recent increas
es in 
fringe benefits my own estimate is that they account for nearly two-thirds o
f the 
increase 10 it would be premature to say that rising marginal tax rates ra
ther 
than (pure) rises in income are the main factor.
Will pension and health contributions continue to grow as a proportion of to
tal 
compensation? My own conjecture is that they will, undsr the status quo or
 any 
change in tax treatment that is under serious consider ion. But the growth
 will 
almost surely be less dramatic than it has been in the p:.st. Although the cal
cula 
tions leading to this guess are best religated to a footnote, M the intuition behind
 the 
guess is straightforward: Consider two workers with equal total compensation. 
One 
has some promised retirement income whereas the other has none. The worker
 who 
already has some retirement income will be less willing to exchange additi
onal 
present income for more retirement benefits than will the other. Thus, as the c
over 
age and level of pension plans (and social security) have increased, more wo
rkers 
have become less willing to trade additional income today for additional retirem
ent 
income. 12 The market for certain nonwage benefits is, in effect, becoming sat
urat 
ed. 13
FRINGE-BENEFIT COVERAGE AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Fringe benefit coverage and payments made by employers vary greatly by ind
us 
try, occupation, sex, and race. Transportation, manufacturing, and mining 
have 
been historically high-benefit industries, whereas services, trade, and construc
tion 
have offered relatively low benefits. 14 Among occupations, the high-benefit occ
upa 
tions are as one might expect: managers and administrators, professional and 
tech 
nical, craft workers, and certain operatives. Service, sales, and clerical occupa
tions 
are, also expectedly, the low-benefit occupations. Even among full-time and full-
year 
workers, women receive lower benefits and are less likely to be covered than 
men. 
As for black-white differentials, blacks are somewhat less likely to be covere
d by 
health insurance and pension benefits (34.8 percent for blacks, 38.2 percen
t for 
whites), and fringe benefits make up a smaller proportion of black than of w
hite 
workers' total compensation. 15
As a whole, voluntary employer-contributions to pensions and to health and l
ife 
insurance tend to make the distribution of income more unequal: High-wage w
ork 
ers receive a larger share of their total compensation as deferred income and in
sur 
ance than do low-wage workers. 16 But it is important to decompose total comp
ensa 
tion into health and life insurance, on the one hand, and pensions and othe
r de 
ferred compensation, on the other. The reason is that health and life insurance 
ben 
efits are roughly proportionately distributed (Smeeding found that insurance b
ene-
10 See p. 180 of my 1983 paper.
11 The response to a change in the price of wage benefits can 1:3 decomposed by the
 Slutsky 
equation as foliowe:e=(k,Xe) (kvXs), where e is the elasticity of d; nand for fringes w
ith respect 
to a change in the price of wages, kw is the share of compensation received as wage
s, s is the 
elasticity of substitution between wages and fringes, and e is the income elasticity 
of demand 
for fringes. Estimates of s and e are such that as the wage share of total compensation
 (k.) falls, 
e also falls. (See the estimates in my 1983 paper.)
IZ Even if the terms of trade between present income and retirement income continu
e to im 
prove (through increasing marginal taxes on income, coupled with exemption of pens
ion contri 
butions), given proportional improvements in those terms of trade will elicit ever s
maller re 
sponses from workers.
13 Munnell (1984) comes to the same conclusion for pension and health benefits by a
 slightly 
different route.
14 Calculations from The National Income and Product Accounts, op. cit.; and Survey
 of Cur 
rent Business (July 1983).
18 See Smeeding (1983), tables 6.2 and 6.3. This discussion depends heavily on Sm
eedings' 
useful paper.
18 Again, see Smeeding 0983), Tables 6.6 and 6.7. Smeeding's findings are corroborate
d by the 
findings of Taylor and Wilensky (1983) for health benefits, and of Kotlikoff and Smith
 (1983) for 
pensions.
" Munnel (1984), pp. 21-22.
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fits ran from 3.7 percent of compensation for low-wnge workers to G.2 percent f
or a 
middle-wage group, and then declined to 2.9 percent for the highest earnings gr
oup) 
whereas deferred compensation is highly regressively distributed (0.4 percen
t of 
compensation for the lowest earnings group to 7.2 percent for the highest).
In contrast, legally required contributions, such as social security, unemployme
nt 
insurance, and workers' compensation tend to be progressively distributed and b
ring 
about greater equality.
In sum, voluntarily provided fringe benefits, unlike legally mandated contrib
u 
tions to social insurance, seem to have a disequalizing influence on income dist
ribu 
tion. This naturally raises questions about the desirability of exempting these b
ene 
fits from federal payroll and personal income taxes.
EQUITY OF THE TAX SYSTEM AND REVENUE LOSSES RESULTING F
ROM FRINGE EXEMPTIONS
If a larger proportion of the total compensation of high-earnings workers is 
re 
ceived as nonwage benefits, as appears to be the case, then the exemption of t
hose 
benefits from payroll and personal income taxes is clearly a regressive aspect o
f the 
tax system. That is, exemption of nonwage benefits violates the vertical equity
 pre 
cept that those with greater ability to pay for government services should do so.
In addition, exemption of nonwage benefits creates situations where horizontal 
in 
equities can and undoubtedly do arise. Consider two individuals, each with 
total 
compensation (wages plus contributions to health insurance, life insurance, and 
pen 
sions) of $20,000. Suppose also that they are both single and declare one exemp
tion 
and the zero-bracket amount. If Smith receives $17,000 in wages, while Jone
s re 
ceives $18,500 in wages, then Jones pays more taxes and faces a higher marg
inal 
tax than Smith. But this clearly violates the precept of horizontal equity 
that 
households equally situated should be taxed equally.
The "pure solution" to this problem, as Munnell has called it, is to include 
all 
employer contribution for employee benefits in taxable gross income. (Increase
s in 
accrued pension contributions would also be included in gross income, since suc
h in 
creases constitute an increase in an individual's lifetime income.) The pure solu
tion 
is attractive both in principle it would mitigate inequities in the tax system
 and 
in the practical sense that it would either raise federal revenues or permit fed
eral 
marginal income and payroll tax rates to be lowered. 1 * The practical difficulti
es of 
implementing this pure approach are minimal. Indeed, those problems that 
exist 
pale beside the political opposition such a proposal would almost certainly mee
t. In 
view of this potent potential opposition, some workable alternative must be sou
ght.
One alternative that has gained currency, and has been introduced in a variety
 of 
guises in legislative proposals, is to limit the amount of the employer's contribu
tion 
to health insurance that is excluded from the worker's taxable gross income. 19 
Such 
an approach would stem what many observers believe to be an inefficient and e
xces 
sive use of the health care system which has led to inflation in that sector,
 and 
would also raise considerable revenues. 20
Placing a tax cap on health contributions has some alluring features, and rep
re 
sents a step in the right direction, but the approach also suffers from two impo
rtant 
defects. First, if we want to improve the equity of the income tax system, he
alth 
insurance contributions should be the last benefit to fully or partially tax, no
t the 
first. As noted above, insurance contributions, alone among voluntarily prov
ided 
fringes, are distributed roughly proportionately. Thus, taxing them would not s
erve 
to improve the vertical equity of the tax structure in fact, calculations by Ta
ylor 
and Wilensky show that the effects of a tax ceiling on health contributions wou
ld be 
felt disproportionately by lower-income groups. 21
The second defect of placing a tax cap on health contributions alone (or on a
ny 
single benefit alone) is that such an approach still leaves contributions to other 
non- 
wage benefits untaxed, and hence opens the door to tax avoidance by substitu
tion 
away from the newly-taxed benefit and toward other still-untaxed benefits. 
Such 
substitution is more than an academic matter it means that the estimates of 
reve 
nue gains that would result from taxing health contributions may be too hig
h. It 
should be emphasized that we have no knowledge of the degree to which subs
titu 
tion from health benefits into pension benefits would take place no study has
 yet
'" Munnell (1984, table 2) estimates the revenue gain from such a comprehensive ta
x to be 
$G4.3 billion in 1U8.'I.
"Sullivan and Gibson (1983) discuss the details of these proposals.
"See Taylor and Wilensky (19831 for some estimates of the potential revenue gains.
81 Taylor and Wilensky (1983), table 9-7, p. 177.
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attempted such measurement. 22 But it is clear that the appeal of a tax-cap on 
health contributions would wane substantially if the possibilities for substitution be 
tween health and pension benefits are strong.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Several studies have found that the growth of fringe benefits in accounted for 
largely by the favorable tax treatment they have received, by increases in real 
income, and by the going of the labor force. Although most of these studies have 
made much of the influence that favorable tax treatment and increasing marginal 
tax rates have had on benefit growth, it would be a mistake to believe that tax 
treatment is the only cause of fringe-benefit growth, and an even greater mistake to 
believe that fringes would vanish if the favorable tax treatment were removed. In 
surance and pension plans are a better buy when purchased through the employer, 
the institutions to provide benefits efficiently are in place, the work force will con 
tinue to age, employers will still make use of deferred benefits as a means of reduc 
ing turnover, and real income will continue to rise for all these reasons, removing 
the favorable tax treatment of benefits would not kill the goose that laid the golden 
egg and jead to the demise of employer-provision of heajth and retirement benefits. 
In addition, equity and fairness in the distribution of income and the distribution 
of the tax burden suggest the expedience of taxing benefits. Pensions and other de 
ferred compensation in particular lessen the equality of the distribution of income, 
so that the failure to tax employer contributions to pension tplans violates the abili- 
ty-to-pay or vertical equity principle of taxation. Also, since individuals with similar 
levels of total compensation may receive quite different mixes of wage and nonwage 
benefits, the failure to tax nonwage benefits introduces horizontal inequities into 
the tax system.
Full or partial taxation of a single specific benefit (such as health-care contribu 
tions) is an unattractive alternative to full or partial ti*,*;ation of nil benefits, be 
cause of the possibility that employees could substitute svay from the newly taxed 
benefit and into still-untaxed benefits (such as pensior ,). Thus, taxation only of 
health contributions would not greatly improve the equity of the tax system. Nei 
ther, it seems likely, would it raise the amounts of revenue that have been prom 
ised, an workers and employers would make adjustments in the benefits package so 
as to avoid taxation. Finally, taxation of a single benefit would fail to correct fully 
the resource misallocation that has resulted from sheltering fringes from taxation- 
all have in effect been subsidized forms of compensation in the past, and an even- 
handed approach to their taxation is needed to mitigate the distorting effects of the 
current system.
Munnell (1984) has discussed several alternatives to comprehensive and full 
income and payroll taxation of all employer contributions for fringes. Her suggested 
"perhaps palatable" alternative, which would limit the proportion of total compen 
sation that an employer could contribute without taxation, hns at least three advan 
tages. First, it is comprehensive, treating nil benefits equally. Second, its focus on 
the proportion of total compensation obviates the sort of wrangling over dollar-sum 
caps than has accompanied proposals to limit tax-free contributions to health insur 
ance. And third, it would have a minimal (if any) immediate effect on workers and 
their benefits, while forestalling further erosion of the tax base. Some such solution 
is greatly needed to redress the resource misallocations and inequities that the fa 
vored tax status of fringe benefits have generated.
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Chairman PICKLE. Our final panelist is Gail Wilensky, director, 
Center for Heath Affairs, and vice president, Domestic Division, 
Project HOPE.
STATEMENT OF GAIL K. WILENSKY. VICE PRESIDENT. DOMESTIC 
DIVISION, PROJECT HOPE
Ms. WU.F.NSKY. I am vice president of the Domestic Division of 
Project HOPE. I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak to
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